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Moral decision-making is a key asset for humans’ integration in social contexts, and theway
we decide about moral issues seems to be strongly inﬂuenced by emotions. For example,
individuals with deﬁcits in emotional processing tend to deliver more utilitarian choices
(accepting an emotionally aversive action in favor of communitarian well-being). However,
little is known about the association between emotional experience and moral-related
patterns of choice. We investigated whether subjective reactivity to emotional stimuli,
in terms of valence, arousal, and dominance, is associated with moral decision-making in
95 healthy adults. They answered to a set of moral and non-moral dilemmas and assessed
emotional experience in valence, arousal and dominance dimensions in response to neutral,
pleasant, unpleasant non-moral, and unpleasant moral pictures. Results showed signiﬁcant
correlations between less unpleasantness to negative stimuli, more pleasantness to
positive stimuli and higher proportion of utilitarian choices. We also found a positive
association between higher arousal ratings to negative moral laden pictures and more
utilitarian choices. Low dominance was associated with greater perceived difﬁculty over
moral judgment. These behavioral results are in ﬁtting with the proposed role of emotional
experience in moral choice.
Keywords: moral-decision making, utilitarian choices, moral emotions, valence, arousal
INTRODUCTION
Moral decision-making is an essential asset for humans’ integra-
tion in social contexts. Emotional processes contribute to moral
judgment by assigning affective value to the moral decision-
making scenarios, thus guiding the distinction between acceptable
and inacceptable behaviors (Haidt, 2001). The presentation of
hypothetical scenarios involving moral violations typically gen-
erate subjective unpleasantness and increased arousal, which are
thought to guide subsequent moral appraisals and decisions (Moll
et al., 2002a; Ostrosky-Solís et al., 2003; Vélez-García et al., 2003;
Harenski and Hamann, 2006). Moreover, the presentation of dif-
ferent types of moral stimuli, includingmoral-ladenpictures (Moll
et al., 2002a; Harenski and Hamann, 2006), moral statements
(Moll et al., 2002b) or moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001, 2004;
Heekeren et al., 2003, 2005; Blair, 2007) evoke signiﬁcant changes
in brain networks specialized in emotional processing, such as
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Conversely, individuals with
ventromedial prefrontal dysfunction (by virtue of psychopathol-
ogy or brain lesions) and emotion processing deﬁcits are typically
more prone to endorse utilitarian choices, which maximize the
aggregate welfare at the expense of the emotional implications of
harming an innocent person (Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Carmona-Perera et al., 2012; Young et al., 2012).
According to the dual process theory (Greene, 2007; Greene
et al., 2008) utilitarian choices are associated with higher order
cognitive control, as illustrated by the impact of cognitive biasing
factors on this type of judgments, including reasoning styles (Amit
and Greene, 2012), cognitive load (Greene et al., 2008; Moore
et al., 2008), priming reﬂection (Paxton et al., 2011), or atten-
tional bias (Van Dillen et al., 2012). By contrast, deontological
choices are preferentially supported by aversive emotional pro-
cessing (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto
et al., 2010; Carmona-Perera et al., 2013a,b). Recent studies have
demonstrated that transient manipulation of speciﬁc emotions
can bias moral decision-making toward utilitarian or deon-
tological choices in response to moral dilemmas. Speciﬁcally,
several studies have demonstrated that the induction of posi-
tively valenced emotions (e.g., happiness, humorous) favors the
tendency to endorse utilitarian choices, whereas the induction
of negatively valenced emotions (e.g, sadness, disgust) favors
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 626 | 1
“fnhum-07-00626” — 2013/9/25 — 17:34 — page 2 — #2
Carmona-Perera et al. Emotional valence and moral decision-making
the tendency to endorse deontological choices (Wheatley and
Haidt, 2005; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Schnall et al., 2008;
Pastötter et al., 2012; Van Dillen et al., 2012). Complementar-
ily, several studies have shown that the motivational tendency
primed by the speciﬁc emotion induced is signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with utilitarian vs. deontological choices in moral dilemmas.
Speciﬁcally, the induction of approach-related emotions (e.g.,
anger) fosters the tendency to endorse utilitarian choices, whereas
the induction of avoidance-related emotions (e.g., disgust) fos-
ters the tendency to endorse deontological choices (Harlé and
Sanfey, 2010; Ugazio et al., 2012). Although these studies ele-
gantly show how transient manipulations of particular emotions
can bias moral decision-making in different directions, consider-
ably less is known about how more stable individual differences
in emotional experience (in response to a range of emotionally
competent stimuli) are associated with decision-making patterns
in moral vs. non-moral scenarios. The Lang bio-informational
model of emotion assumes that individual differences in emo-
tional experience can be reliably and efﬁciently tracked using
the subjective responses to emotional stimuli on three relevant
aspects of emotion: valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness of the
experience), arousal (activation generated by the experience), and
dominance (degree of control that one is able to exert over the
emotional experience induced; Greenwald et al., 1989; Lang et al.,
1993). In this dimensional system, categorical emotions are quan-
titatively represented; for example, anger would be linked to high
unpleasantness, high arousal and high dominance, whereas fear
would be linked to high unpleasantness, high arousal but low
dominance.
In this study we aimed to investigate whether individual dif-
ferences in emotional experience, based on the Lang model, are
associated with individual differences in moral decision-making
patterns, as measured by a battery of moral (and non-moral)
dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). Speciﬁcally, we examined whether
individual differences in subjective reactivity to affective stimuli
is speciﬁcally associated with moral (vs. non-moral) decision-
making in healthy adults, and whether individual variations in the
valence, arousal and dominance subjective emotional ratings are
associated with speciﬁc utilitarian vs. deontological choice pat-
terns. Based on the previous literature, we hypothesize that (1)
individual differences in emotional experience will be speciﬁcally
correlated with decision-making in moral but not in non-moral
scenarios; (2) subjective ratings indexing greater unpleasant-
ness, high arousal and low dominance emotional experience will
be associated with predominantly deontological choice patterns,
whereas subjective ratings indexing lower experience of unpleas-
antness, low arousal and high dominance will be associated with
predominantly utilitarian choice patterns.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The sample consisted of 95 healthy adults (49 males and 46
females). All participants were of European-Caucasian origin and
were recruited from local community and recreational centers
during the ﬁrst semester of 2011 through ﬂyers-based advertise-
ment andword-of-mouth communication. Eligibility criteriawere
deﬁned as follows: (i) to be literate enough to ensure reading
comprehension, and correctly complete the tests; (ii) not having
lifetime use of illegal drugs in more than ﬁve occasions or current
or past diagnoses of substance dependence (with the exception
of nicotine); (iii) not having history of head injury or neurologi-
cal disorders; (iv) and not having clinically signiﬁcant psychiatric
symptoms. The Interview for Research on Addictive Behaviour
(IRAB; Verdejo-García et al., 2005) was used to assess compliance
with the absence of drug use/dependence criterion, and the Symp-
tom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1977) was used
to assess compliance with the absence of signiﬁcant psychiatric
symptoms criterion. The sample had a mean (standard devia-
tion) of 49 years-old (10.67) and 18 years of education (2.38).
Socioeconomic status was assessed through occupation prestige
and mean family income (through self-reports). We classiﬁed
the participants into three socioeconomic categories: low level
(17.9%), average level (63.2%) and high level (17.9%). None of
these demographic variables affected moral decision-making (all
p > 0.05).
INSTRUMENTS
Emotional experience task
Weused a set of 40 picture stimuli extracted from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1988) and other sources
such as the internet. Based on the IAPS norms (Lang et al., 1988),
we deﬁned four picture categories or conditions of interest: (i)
neutral (10 pictures displaying landscapes, household objects), (ii)
pleasant (10 pictures displaying sexual and radical sports scenes),
(iii) unpleasant non-moral laden (10 pictures displaying accident-
related casualties or mutilations), and (iv) unpleasant moral laden
(10 pictures displaying poverty or one to one violence scenes).
Since moral content is not addressed in the IAPS norms, we con-
ducted a pilot study (n = 83 undergraduate students) to evaluate
“perceived moral content” in an initial pool of 22 images with
suitable contents for the unpleasant moral laden category. The 10
images with higher “perceived moral content” ratings (>7.5 in a
1–10 range) were ﬁnally included in this (iv) category. As a further
check the 40 images included in the emotional experience taskwere
also evaluated for “perceived moral content” by the study sample
(n = 95), and we conﬁrmed that the 10 images included in this
category signiﬁcantly differed from those included in the other cat-
egories on“perceivedmoral content”[F(3, 282) 721.20, p< 0.001].
The main dependent measure for each of the picture categories
were the subjective ratings of valence (from 1 –unpleasant– to 9
–pleasant–), arousal (from 1 –relaxed– to 9 –aroused–), and domi-
nance (from1–dominant– to 9 –dominated–). The responseswere
recorded using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980).
As dependent variables we used the mean of valence, arousal and
dominance scores for each of the four categories of pictures.
Moral decision-making task
We used a subset of 32 hypothetical dilemmas extracted from
Greene battery (Greene et al., 2001). The original Greene battery
was adapted to Spanish language through a back-translation pro-
cess. The ensuing items were evaluated using Rasch analysis to
obtain a briefer construct-validmeasure of moral decision-making
(Carmona-Perera et al., under review).Weused the calibration and
item ﬁt tests to remove redundant and low quality items impacted
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by commonly confounding variables outside moral decision-
making (e.g., socio-demographic factors). We also excluded those
moral dilemmas that fell at the tails (>95%) of the deontological
or utilitarian response distributions, since they are less likely to
constitute an actual decision dilemma. The ﬁnal 32-item Span-
ish version has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78, Spearman Brown coefﬁcient = 0.76;
Carmona-Perera et al., under review). This task is composed by
eight non-moral dilemmas involving a rational decision without
moral content (e.g., to travel by train or bus given certain time
constraints, or to buy a new camera or to have your old camera
repaired for the same price), and 24 moral dilemmas which con-
cern the appropriateness of moral violations for a higher beneﬁt
(e.g., smothering a baby to save a group of people, or throwing a
dying person into the sea to keep a lifeboat of survivors aﬂoat).
These moral dilemmas involve different degrees of emotional
salience based on the extent of personal involvement and the ensu-
ing severity of harm (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). Therefore, the task
included both Personal dilemmas (16 items) which involve higher
emotional salience and Impersonal dilemmas (8 items) which
involve lower emotional salience. Participants were asked to pro-
vide “choice” (afﬁrmative vs. negative) and “perceived difﬁculty”
responses (from 1 –low– to 10 –high–). For moral dilemmas afﬁr-
mative answers were considered “utilitarian” (e.g., to kill someone
to save a group of people), and negative answers “deontologi-
cal” (e.g., to refuse the harmful action regardless the aggregate
well-being). For non-moral dilemmas afﬁrmative answers were
considered “efﬁcient” (e.g., to travel by the fastest transport to
arrive on time), and negative answers “non-efﬁcient” (e.g., to
travel by the preferred transport despite off to arrive late). The
proportion of afﬁrmative choices and the mean of perceived level
of difﬁculty for moral and non-moral scenarios were computed as
main dependent variables.
PROCEDURE
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee for Human
Research of the University of Granada. Before testing, all partici-
pants were informed about the study protocols and they signed a
written informed consent to certiﬁcate their voluntary collabora-
tion. The information sheet included the following information:
“We are interested in exploring how you make decisions in relation
to a set of moral and non-moral hypothetical scenarios, and how
you experience emotions in relation to a set of affective pictures.
We will ask you to decide whether you would accept or refuse to
take a proposed action concerning moral and non-moral scenar-
ios. In a separate task, we will ask you to report your subjective
emotional experience in response to both pleasant and unpleasant
stimuli.” To describe each SAM scale we used the standardized
guidelines of Lang et al. (2001). Participants were assessed indi-
vidually in a single session that lasted approximately 90 min.
The emotional experience and the moral decision-making tasks
were administered in computerized format using two different
orders, such that half of the sample performed ﬁrst the dilem-
mas and then the pictures and half of the sample did it in the
reverse sequence. In the emotional experience task categories were
presented in a counter-balanced order across participants. In all
cases, each picture was presented during 6 s, followed by a 2 s
black screen with a ﬁxation cross. Participants were instructed
to stare at the picture and rate their emotional experience using
the SAM scales of valence, arousal and dominance, with no time
limits established. In the moral dilemmas task the different sub-
sets of dilemmas (moral personal, moral impersonal, non-moral)
were also presented in a counter-balanced order. Each was pre-
sented through three subsequent computer screens. The ﬁrst
screen described the dilemma (presentation); the second screen
presented the response options and requested the choice (decision-
making), and the third screen presented the difﬁculty scale and
requested the perceived difﬁculty rating. Each screen continued
with no time limit as the participants read and responded to the
dilemmas.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We used repeated-measures ANOVAs to test the main effects of
picture categories on subjective valence, arousal and dominance
ratings in the emotional experience task, and of type of dilemma
on the afﬁrmative choices and perceived difﬁculty in the moral
decision-making task. Pairwise Bonferrroni post-hoc tests were
used to examine speciﬁc effects driven by the different picture cat-
egories and types of dilemmas. To test our main assumptions, we
conductedPearsonproduct-moment correlation analyses between
the valence, arousal, and dominance ratings to the images included
in the different picture categories, and the choices and difﬁculty
ratings to the moral and non-moral dilemmas. The Bonferroni
correction was used to adjust the signiﬁcance levels of correlation
coefﬁcients for multiple comparisons (Curtin and Schulz, 1998).
Results are presented reporting the corrected p values.
RESULTS
SUBJECTIVE REACTIVITY TO EMOTIONAL STIMULI
Results showed the expected signiﬁcant differences between the
valence, arousal and dominance ratings evoked by the images
grouped in the different picture categories (see Table 1). Pair-
wise comparisons showed signiﬁcant effects in all contrasts, with
the exception of the contrast between unpleasant non-moral laden
and unpleasant moral laden categories, which had similar valence,
arousal and dominance ratings. Moreover, the unpleasant pic-
tures (non-moral and moral) yielded higher unpleasantness and
arousing ratings, and lower dominance ratings, than all other
conditions.
DECISION-MAKING AND DIFFICULTY RATINGS TO MORAL AND
NON-MORAL DILEMMAS
ANOVA analyses showed signiﬁcant differences between moral
and non-moral dilemmas in terms of afﬁrmative choices [F(1,
94) = 593.82, p < 0.001], and difﬁculty [F(1, 94) 346.34,
p < 0.001]. Moral dilemmas yielded less afﬁrmative choices
(M = 58.72, SD = 13.78) and higher perceived difﬁculty
(M = 4.08, SD = 1.38) than non-moral dilemmas (M = 97.24,
SD = 5.82, and M = 1.58, SD = 0.64, respectively). We also found
signiﬁcant differences between personal and impersonal moral
dilemmas on utilitarian choices [F(1, 94) 765.56, p < 0.001] and
difﬁculty ratings [F(1, 94) 51.81, p < 0.001]. Personal dilemmas
yielded less utilitarian choices (personal: M = 28.62, SD = 20.01;
impersonal: M = 88.82, SD = 14.29) and higher perceived
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Table 1 | Descriptive scores, ANOVA and post-hoc comparisons for emotional valence, arousal, and dominance.
Subjective reactivity Picture ctegories, Mean (SD) F Post-hoc
Non-significant (p)
Neutral (1) Pleasant (2) Unpleasant
non-moral laden (3)
Unpleasant
moral laden (4)
Valence 5.65 (0.86) 7.47 (0.90) 1.94 (0.72) 1.96 (0.73) 143.97* 3 = 4 (p = 1.000)
Arousal 3.97 (1.22) 5.82 (1.60) 7.46 (0.86) 7.60 (0.83) 213.18* 3 = 4 (p = 0.511)
Dominance 8.42 (0.90) 7.49 (1.43) 5.26 (2.27) 5.07 (2.35) 148.67* 3 = 4 (p = 1.000)
F value associated to the tests of within-subjects effects (Huynh-Feldt correction); *p value <0.01
difﬁculty (personal: M = 4.69, SD = 1.70; impersonal: M = 3.48,
SD = 1.50).
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE REACTIVITY TO EMOTIONAL
STIMULI AND UTILITARIAN CHOICES AND DIFFICULTY RATINGS TO
DILEMMAS
Results showed that the subjective ratings evoked by the emo-
tional stimuli were speciﬁcally associated with decision-making
in moral, but not in non-moral, scenarios. The proportion of
afﬁrmative (utilitarian) choices in moral dilemmas (merging both
personal and impersonal dilemmas) correlated with both valence
and arousal ratings (see Figure 1). However, we found non-
signiﬁcant correlations between the proportion of afﬁrmative
(efﬁcient) choices in non-moral dilemmas and the subjective rat-
ings of valence, arousal or dominance (all p ≥ 0.170). Separate
correlations between personal or impersonal moral dilemmas and
the emotional experience task failed to show signiﬁcant effects in
all picture categories for valence (p ≥ 0.181), arousal (p ≥ 0.096)
and dominance ratings (p ≥ 0.235).
Signiﬁcant correlations between moral (personal and imper-
sonal) decisions and emotional experience indicated that moral
choices were associated with valence ratings to both unpleasant
(moral: r = −0.29, p = 0.016; non-moral: r = −0.26, p = 0.043)
and pleasant images (r = 0.26, p = 0.047); experiencing less
unpleasantness in response to unpleasant images (both moral and
non-moral), andmore pleasantness in response to pleasant images
were associated with more utilitarian choices (see Figure 1A).
Moral choices were also associated with arousal ratings to unpleas-
ant moral laden images (r = 0.34, p = 0.004); higher arousal
responses correlated with more utilitarian choices (see Figure 1B).
The perceived difﬁculty ratings to the moral dilemmas were neg-
atively correlated with dominance ratings across the moral and
non-moral negative picture categories (unpleasant non-moral,
r =−0.26; p=0.043; andunpleasantmoral, r =−0.29; p=0.016).
Conversely, moral choices or difﬁculty ratings failed to correlate
with the perceived moral content of the images.
DISCUSSION
The main ﬁndings of this study are the following: (1) individual
differences in self-reported emotional experience correlate with
decision-making in moral scenarios, but not in non-moral sce-
narios; (2) lower experience of unpleasantness to both moral and
non-moral unpleasant images and higher experience of pleas-
antness to pleasant images are associated with utilitarian choice
patterns; (3) higher experience of arousal (speciﬁcally in response
to moral laden images) are associated with more utilitarian
FIGURE 1 | Dispersion graph of correlation between proportion of utilitarian choices in moral dilemmas and subjective reactivity of valence (A) and
arousal (B) to affective stimuli.
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choices; and (4) lower dominance over emotions is signiﬁcantly
associated with higher perceived difﬁculty to make decisions in
moral scenarios. In agreement with our initial hypotheses, these
ﬁndings support the speciﬁc association between emotional expe-
rience and moral decision-making, and support the notion that
diminished experience of unpleasantness favors utilitarian choice
patterns. The association between higher arousal to unpleas-
ant moral laden pictures and utilitarian choices, and between
low dominance and higher moral difﬁculty were not originally
predicted and may warrant further research.
In agreement with previous ﬁndings, we showed that decision-
making in healthy populations is sensitive to the impact of moral
vs. non-moral content scenarios (Moll et al., 2001; Harenski and
Hamann, 2006; Tassy et al., 2013; Van Bavel et al., 2013), and to the
impact of personal vs. impersonal involvement within these moral
scenarios (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Moretto et al., 2010; Koenigs
et al., 2007; Carmona-Perera et al., 2013a). Difﬁculty of judgment
may also contribute to describe the emotional weight attached to
these choices. For example to push a button to kill someone (low
emotional salience) is considered easier than to push a person to
the train tracks (high emotional salience). Therefore, participants
demonstrated sensitivity to moral content, and to the degree of
emotional salience associated with this content.
Correlation analyses showed that moral-related patterns of
choice (including both personal and impersonal dilemmas) cor-
relate with subjective emotional experience, at difference with
non-moral related decisions. Because separate consideration of
personal and impersonal dilemmas did not result in signiﬁcant
correlations with emotional experience, our results can only speak
of the association between moral-related decisions and emotional
experience. In this respect, our ﬁndings are in agreement with
those of previous studies that have demonstrated associations
between the processing of moral (vs. non-moral) contents and
emotional reactivity (Moll et al., 2001; Harenski and Hamann,
2006; Tassy et al., 2013; Van Bavel et al., 2013). The direction of the
signiﬁcant correlations between higher subjective valence ratings
and higher proportion of utilitarian choices inmoral dilemmas are
in agreementwith the speciﬁc role of emotional processes inmoral
decision-making (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001). The dual pro-
cess model of moral judgment posits that a decreased sensitivity to
the negative emotional input attached tomoral violationsmay fos-
ter utilitarian choice patterns (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2008).
Therefore, it is expectable that those individuals with less ability to
experience unpleasantness are more prone to endorse utilitarian
choices. The ﬁndings can also be theoretically accounted by the
“undoing hypothesis,” which proposes that positive moods can
“undo” the cognitive and physiological effects of negative emo-
tions, thus decreasing experience of unpleasantness and increasing
utilitarian biases (Fredrickson et al., 2000; Fredrickson and Brani-
gan, 2005). These ﬁndings are also in agreement with a plethora
of previous evidence demonstrating that induction of positive
emotions reliably bias moral decision-making toward utilitarian
patterns (Pastötter et al., 2012; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006).
In partial disagreement with our initial hypothesis (lower
arousal associated with utilitarian choices) we found a positive
correlation between higher arousal ratings to unpleasant moral
laden pictures and higher proportion of utilitarian choices. These
ﬁndings can be accounted by the inverted U-shaped association
between arousal and decision-making, whereby moderate levels of
arousal are optimal to process the emotional input that is relevant
for decision-making, but toomuchor too little arousal becomedis-
rupting (Miu et al., 2008). Speciﬁcally, it has been demonstrated
that high levels of arousal are associated with reduced ability
to detect the relevant aspects of emotional input in the context
of emotion regulation for dilemmas-solving (Blair et al., 2012).
Therefore, we tentatively suggest that higher arousal sensitivity
maybe associatedwith greater inﬂuence of the emotional informa-
tion that is irrelevant to address themoral dilemmas. Alternatively,
these ﬁndings could be interpreted in the context of attentional
control models of emotions, which postulate an attentional inter-
ference effects due to a higher arousal levels (Schimmack and
Derryberry, 2005; Jefferies et al., 2008). Decreased attentional con-
trol has been recently linked to utilitarian choices (VanDillen et al.,
2012). Therefore, attentional process may also account for these
ﬁndings, playing a moderator role between emotional experience
and utilitarian choices.
An additional interesting ﬁnding was the association between
lower dominance over emotions and higher perceived difﬁculty to
decide about themoral dilemmas. Previous cognitive neuroscience
studies have associated individual differences in emotional regula-
tionwithmoral decision-making, identifying that lower emotional
control increase the difﬁculty to decide, since the individual is
driven into a more exhaustive appraisal process (Harenski et al.,
2009; Bartels and Rips, 2010; Koven, 2011). Lower dominance rat-
ings are associated with lower emotional control in the perceived
situation (Bradley and Lang, 1994), such that our results agree
with the notion that lower emotional control associates with more
complex (more highly difﬁcult-perceived) appraisal processes.
In summary, we provide novel evidence about the association
between subjective emotional experience and moral decision-
making in a community sample. The strengths of the study include
the use of a representative community sample from the healthy
population, the use of well-validated quantitative measures of
emotional experience and moral decision-making, and the poten-
tial relevance of our ﬁndings for clinical implications. Because we
show that variations in emotional experience, but not in subjective
perceptions of moral content, are associatedwith utilitarian biases,
we reason that the interventions for individuals with moral judg-
ment problems should focus on training and shaping emotional
response, rather than working on the “rules” characterizing moral
violations. These type of emotional interventions may be useful
to restore social decision-making in patients with acquired brain
injuries (Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010), psychopathy
(Blair, 2007; Young et al., 2012) or drug addictions (Carmona-
Perera et al., 2012; Khemiri et al., 2012). Our results should be
also interpreted in the context of its relevant limitations. First,
personal and impersonal moral dilemmas (differing on emotional
salience) did not differentially correlate with emotional experi-
ence. Hence, future studies are warranted to explore whether our
ﬁndings can be replicated in more heterogeneous samples allow-
ing further variance within personal and impersonal categories.
Second, since emotional input impacts not only on moral choice
but also on a range of other decision-making processes (Paulus
and Yu, 2012) future studies are also warranted to determine
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whether reported associations apply only to utilitarian vs. deonto-
logical moral decision-making choices, or to a wider spectrum of
decision-making scenarios. An additional limitation is the choice
to base the emotional measurement only on subjective responses,
disregarding complementary physiological or external behavioral
indices (Lang et al., 1993) that should be included in future stud-
ies; and the non-measurement of some potential moderators of
the link between emotion and moral decision-making – e.g., cog-
nitive processes (Greene et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2008; Paxton
et al., 2011; Amit and Greene, 2012; Van Dillen et al., 2012), per-
sonality traits (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011), or desirability to social
and experimental demands (Lumer, 2010; Hess andKotter-Grühn,
2011; Caravita et al., 2012).
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